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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
proponents of the will, therefore, failed to sustain their burden of proof of
compliance with the statute in the absence of affirmative evidence that
the testator did in fact sign first. The judgment of the probate court was
affirmed, not because of non-compliance with the statute governing due
execution, but on the ground of insufficient evidence.3 4
The chief criticism with the reasoning of the Borgman opinion is the
strong, although obter, statement of the court that on proof of the testator's
prior subscription the will should be probated despite the fact that the
testators signature was not visible to the attesting witnesses. The Oho
statute, which is patterned after the English Wills Act of 1837, unequivo-
,cally requires that the testator acknowledge his signature before two wit-
nesses. It has already been noted that England and other American juris-
dictions with similar statutes have held that an invisible signature cannot
be acknowledged. A proper construction of the Ohio state, therefore, should
lead to a similar conclusion, despite proof of the testator's prior subscription.
MARSHALL I. NURENBERG
Right of Purchaser to Benefit of Vendor's
Policy of Insurance
THE GREAT weight of authority supports the doctrine that from the
date of the making of an unconditional contract for the sale of real prop-
erty the purchaser is equitably and beneficially the owner of the property
subject only to the vendor's right to possession, rents and profits prior to
the actual conveyance. On this basis, the purchaser is held to bear the risk
of loss to the property from the date of the making of the contract. There-
fore, if the realty is damaged during the escrow period, the purchaser must
accept the damaged property without any deduction from the purchase
price.'
A minority of courts take the position that the risk of loss remains on
the vendor until the time of conveyance of the realty.2 These courts, reject-
ing the theory of equitable conversion,3 state that the intent of the parties is,
in accordance with business practice and common sense, that the risk of
' Cf. Roosa v. Wickward, 90 Ohio App. 213, 105 N.E.2d 454 (1950). At the
probate proceeding, the testimony of the surviving witness was essentially the same
as that of the surviving witnesses in Borgman v. Dillow. Based on this testimony the
probate court refused to probate the proffered will. The court of appeals failed to
decide the important issue of substantive law in the case, namely, whether the
testator's invisible signature was impliedly acknowledged to the surviving witness,
but on procedural grounds reversed the judgment of the probate court
'See note 31 sapra.
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loss shall pass to the purchaser at the time of performance. A few courts
have taken the view that the risk of loss is on the party in possession. 4
Even in those states adhering to the majority rule, the vendor retains the
risk of loss in the following situations: where the contract of sale is any
way conditional and not all the conditions have been satisfied;5 where the
performance of the contract is delayed through the fault of the vendor;6
where the loss is caused by the negligence of the vendor;7 and where the
contract expressly provides that the risk of loss remains on the vendor until
the date of performance or that the premises are to be delivered in as good a
condition as existed at the time of the making of the contract 8
When property which is the subject of an unexecuted contract of sale
is destroyed or damaged by fire or some other hazard, there is often an in-
surance policy in effect which protects against loss from the particular in-
jury to the property. If the contract of sale contains a provision concerning
the distribution of insurance proceeds in the event of a loss during the
escrow period, the courts will give this provision full effect? However, the
'Thompson v. Norton, 14 Ind. 187 (1860); Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 71
Iowa 532, 32 N.W 514 (1887);.Johnston v. Jones, 12 B. Mon. 326 (Ky. 1851);
Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md. 301 (1869); Ins. Co. v. Dye, 233 Mo. App. 926, 20
S.W.2d 946 (1929); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W 74 (1921);
Marion v. Wolcott, 68 N.J. Eq. 20, 59 Atl. 242 (1904); Sutton v. Davis, 143 N.C.
474, 55 S.F. 844 (1906); Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N.D. 42, 111 N.W 623
(1907); Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926 (1900); Elliott v. Ashland
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 117 Pa. 548, 12 Ad. 676 (1888); Russell v. Elliott, 45 S.D.
184, 186 N.W 824 (1922); Oldham v. Kennedy, 3 Humph. 260 (Tenn. 1842);
Virginian 1R. v. Jeffries, 110 Va. 471, 66 S.E. 731 (1909); Mandru v. Hum-
phreys, 83 W Va. 307, 98 S.E. 259 (1919).
'Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 Ad. 205 (1935); Durham v. Mc-
Cready, 129 Me. 279, 151 Atl. 544 (1930); Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221,
128 N.E. 13 (1920); Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133 (1869); Wilson v. Clark,
60 N.H. 352 (1880); Elmore v. Stephens-Russell Co. 88 Ore. 509, 171 Pac 763
(1918); Johnson v. Stalcup, 176 Wash. 153, 28 P.2d 279 (1934).
'For a discussion of the relation between equitable conversion and risk of loss, see
WALSH, EQurry § 96 (1930).
' Kelly v. Smith, 218 Cal. 543, 24 P.2d 471 (1933); Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc.
190, 220 N.Y. Supp. 689 (1927), af'd wthowt opinwo, 222 App. Div. 719, 225
N.Y. Supp. 890 (1927); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N.W.
505 (1930).
'Skeen v. Ellis, 105 Ark. 513, 152 S.W 153 (1912); Lombard v. Chicago Sinai
Congregaton, 64 IML 477 (1872); Ford v. Russell, 13 L.a. App. 390, 128 So. 310(1930); Frankiewicz v. Konwinski, 246 Mich. 473, 224 N.W 368 (1929); Gilbert
& Ives v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876).
'Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367 (1885).
'Good v. Jarrard, 93 S.C. 229, 76 S.E. 229 (1912).
'Goddard v. Bebout, 40 Ind. 114 (1872); Marks v. Tichenor, 85 Ky. 536, 4 S.W.
225 (1887); Green v. Kelly, 20 N.J.L 544 (1845); Brownell v. Board of Edu-
cation, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).
'Bruce v. Jennings, 190 Ga. 618, 10 S.E.2d 56 (1940); Craig v. Crossman, 209
Mich. 462, 177 N.W 400 (1920).
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cases are in conflict as to the distribution of the insurance fund in the ab-
sence of such a provision.
A contract of insurance is essentially a personal one and does not run
with the property to a transferee.10 Thus, a contract of fire insurance in-
sures the policyholder against loss which he may suffer through the destruc-
tion of a particular interest in the property as a result of fire. On this basis
an English court in Rayner v. Prestonz" held that the purchaser had no
right to the insurance fund. In this case the vendor had received proceeds of
a fire insurance policy covering the realty which had been damaged by fire
after the contract of sale but before the transfer of tide. After paying the
purchase money to the vendor, the purchaser then filed a bill asking that the
vendor either pay him the insurance money or use it to repair the damage to
the property. The court reasoned that since the contract of insurance was
a personal one between the insurance company and the vendor, it did not
run with the land, and, therefore, the purchaser had no claim to the insur-
ance money. In a later proceeding,12 the vendor was compelled to return
the insurance money to the insurer because he had suffered no loss.
The rule laid down in Rayner v. Preston has been followed by the Eng-
lish courts's and by one American jurisdiction.' 4 The great majority of
American courts, however, hold that if the loss falls on the purchaser the
insurance fund in the hands of the vendor must be used to reduce any un-
paid balance of the purchase price owed to him.'3 If the insurance money
received by the vendor exceeds the unpaid purchase price, the remainder
of the insurance fund is held by the vendor in trust for the purchaser.16
A problem exists under the majority rule as to how the insurance fund is
"VANCE, INSURANCE § 13 (3d ed. 1951).
U18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
"Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883)
'West of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs, [1897] 1 Q.B. 226; Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Spooner, [1905] 2 K.B. 753.
'
4 King v. Preston, 11 La. Annual Rep. 95 (1856); cf. Brownell v. Board of Edu.
cation, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925). Note, 23 KY. L.J. 505 (1935).
'Bruce v. Jennings, 190 Ga. 618, 10 SXE.2d 56 (1940); Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa
44, 204 N.W 235 (1925); Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W 1094
(1926); Skinner & Sons' Dry Dock Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 At. 85
(1900); Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S.W.2d 946 (1929);
McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W 74 (1921); Persico v. Guernsey,
129 Misc. 190, 220 N.Y. Supp. 689 (1927); Peck v. Hale, 11 Ohio App. 418
(1919); Russell v. Elliott, 45 S.D. 184, 186 N.W 824 (1922).
"Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44, 204 N.W 235 (1925); Skinner & Sons' Dry Dock
Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Ad. 85 (1900).
If the risk of loss is upon the vendor, he alone is entitled to the insurance pro-
ceeds. Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900).
The purchaser is entitled to the insurance money if the vendor assigns his rights
under the policy to the purchaser either before or after the loss. Zenor v. Hayes,
228 IM. 626, 81 N.E. 1144 (1907); Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863).
[Winter
NOTES
to be distributed if the selling price of the property is less than the amount
of loss and, consequently, less than the amount of insurance money received
by the vendor. According to the 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance
Policy,17 the limit of the insurer's liability is the actual cash value 8 at the
time of the loss but such liability is not to exceed the cost of repair or re-
placement of the property. Would the portion of the insurance fund re-
ceived by the vendor in excess of the sales price be retained by hun free
from any charges, or would the court hold this also to be held in trust for
the purchaser? No cases have been found in point. Since the courts are
in effect treating the insurance as "running with the land" in these cases,"0
the excess of the insurance money over the selling price should also be con-
sidered as held in trust by the vendor for the purchaser. The vendor should
not be allowed to receive more than the price for which he contracted to
sell the property. Since the purchaser made a good bargain, he should be
the one to receive the excess insurance money.
In some instances the purchaser pays for the policy of insurance. When
the purchaser procures and maintains the policy in his own name, he has the
exclusive right to the proceeds in the event of a loss.20 The contract of sale
may provide, however, that the insurance is to be maintained at the pur-
chaser's expense but in the vendor's.name. In this case the purchaser may
require that the insurance money be applied as will best protect his inter-
est.2
1
Ohio is in accord with the majority view that the purchaser is the
equitable owner of the property, and, therefore, the risk of loss is upon
him.22 Ohio courts, however, have not fully settled the question as to the
right of the purchaser to the insurance proceeds under a policy carried by
the vendor. In an early case, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the vendor
is the trustee of the property, and that insurance proceeds from the fire
were held in trust by him for the purchaser.23 Although this statement
supports the majority view in the United States, because there was only an
unexercised option, the vendor-purchaser relation was held not to have
come into existence, and, therefore, the remarks of the court are not part of
the holding of the case. Subsequently, a court of appeals adopted the ma-
ITN.Y. INs. LAw § 168. The New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy has been
adopted in all states except- Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Texas.
'For a discussion of the meaning of "actual cash value," see Note, 56 A.L.R. 1149.
See cases cited in notes 15 and 16 supra.
" Hammer v. Johnson, 44 Ill. 92 (1867); Goodin & B. Coal Co. v. Southern Elk-
horn Coal Co., 219 Ky. 827, 294 S.W 792 (1927).
' Naqun v. Texas Say. & Real Estate Invest. Ass'n, 95 Tex. 313, 67 S.W 85 (1902);
Baker v. Rushford, 91 Vt 495, 101 AtL 769 (1917).
'Oak Building & Roofing Co. v. Susor, 32 Ohio App. 66, 166 N.E. 908 (1929).
' Gilbert & Ives v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276, 292 (1876).
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jority rule. 4 So even though there has been no supreme court decision,
what little Ohio law there is on the point follows the majority rule.
With no supreme court decision to guide them, Ohio attorneys should
be constantly aware of the pitfall into which a prospective buyer of realty
could stumble. Perhaps the safest solution to the problem would be to have
an express provision in the purchase agreement for the location of the risk
of loss and for the disbursement of insurance money in the event of a loss.
With such a provision in the contract, the courts would recognize this as
being the intent of the parties and would enforce it.25
It is a reasonable assumption that in the commercial world the average
vendor and purchaser of real property believe that fire insurance policies
procured by the vendor protect whatever interest the purchaser may have m
the realty due to the contract of sale. Despite the general principle of law
that a contract of insurance does not run with the land,2 6 it seems only
proper to say- "If that is the meaning in the market place, that should also
be its meaning in the courtroom."2 If the risk of loss is to fall on the pur-
chaser, therefore, the majority American rule that the purchaser will re-
ceive the benefit of the vendor's contract of insurance, at least up to the
extent of the purchaser's actual loss, seems more realistic than the English
rule denying the purchaser any rights in the insurance fund.
Since insurance companies receive the entire premiums for their
policies,2" they should not be able to avoid all liability because of the tech-
mcal reasoning a few courts have adopted. This is dearly a situation in
which equity ought to imply a trust as a remedial fiction. The vendor
should recover the full amount of the loss to the extent of his insurance.
This fund, in the hands of the vendor, then takes the place of the damaged
property and is held in trust for the purchaser.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The majority rule in the United States, which is at present the law
"Peck v. Hale, 11 Ohio App. 418 (1919).
'Goddard v. Bebout, 40 Ind. 114 (1872); Marks v. Tichenor, 85 Ky. 536, 4 S.W
225 (1887); Green v. Kelly, 20 N.J.L. 544 (1845); Brownell v. Board of Educa-
tion, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).
'Bruce v. Jennings, 190 Ga. 618, 10 S.E.2d 56 (1940); Craig v. Crossman, 209
Mich. 462, 177 N.W 400 (1920)
'Comment, 34 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1924).
'Fire insurance rates on property are determined by various rating bureaus using
many systems and schedules for the computation of the rates. For example, the
rates in Ohio are determined by the Ohio Inspection Bureau. All of these systems
and schedules are based on the physical hazard of the property; i.e., construction of
the building, type of occupancy, etc. None of these schedules provide for a variance
in the rates due to any moral hazard of a particular insured.
The English rule was changed by statute in 1925. 15 GEO. V, c. 20, § 47 (1925).
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